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In this paper a selection theory for stochastic games is developed. The theory itself is
based on the ideas of Harsanyi and Selten to select equilibria for games in standard
form. We introduce several possible definitions for the stochastic tracing procedure, an
extension of the linear tracing procedure to the class of stochastic games. We analyze
the properties of these alternative definitions. We show that exactly one of the proposed
extensions is consistent with the formulation of Harsanyi–Selten for games in standard
form and captures stationarity.
Keywords: Game theory; Stochastic games; equilibrium selection; linear tracing proce-
dure; correlated beliefs.
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1. Introduction
Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley (1953). He considered both finite and
infinite horizon two-person zero-sum stochastic games with finite state space and
finite action spaces. Shapley proved that such games have a value and that both
players possess optimal stationary strategies with respect to the discounted pay-
off criterion. Fink (1964), Takahashi (1964), and Sobel (1971) extended Shapley’s
model to n-person non-zero-sum stochastic games. For the model with finite state
space and finite action spaces they showed the existence of a stationary equilibrium.
A stochastic game is played in stages. At each stage, the game is in one of finitely
many states and every player observes the current state. In each stage the players
have to make a choice (simultaneously and independently) out of the action sets
which depend on the state. These choices result not only in a payoff (each state
is coupled with a normal form game), but also in an action dependent probability
measure on the set of states. Next, according to this probability measure, a chance
experiment is carried out to determine the state of the next stage.
For many normal form games there is a vast multiplicity of equilibria (see
McLennan (1999)). The situation is not better for the multiplicity of equilibria
in stochastic games, even when one restricts attention to stationary equilibria. It
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can be shown that there is typically a finite number of equilibria (see Haller and
Lagunoff (2000)), or even that there is an odd number of equilibria (see Herings
and Peeters (2000)). However, the results of McLennan (1999) indicate that one
should expect that the number of stationary equilibria is extremely large for an
average stochastic game. It is therefore important to develop and analyze selection
theories that select a particular stationary equilibrium. The aim of this paper is to
extend the linear tracing procedure, which is proposed by Harsanyi and Selten to
select equilibria in standard form games, in order to achieve equilibrium selection
within the class of stationary equilibria in stochastic games.
In this paper four ways to extend the linear tracing procedure of Harsanyi and
Selten (1988) to the setting of stochastic games are presented. The four alternatives
originate from two choices of modeling beliefs in stochastic games. First, there is
the assumption about beliefs within states. Second, there is the assumption about
beliefs across time (stages). Both belief-types might be assumed to be correlated
or not. After properly defining the four alternatives, they are analyzed. Only one
of the extensions turns out to be consistent with the linear tracing procedure while
capturing stationarity. We label this extension of the linear tracing procedure to
the class of stochastic games as the stochastic tracing procedure.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we introduce the notation for stochas-
tic games, we make the restriction to stationary strategies, and we define the concept
of stationary equilibrium. Section 3 is an introduction to the linear tracing proce-
dure. In Sec. 4, the four extensions of the linear tracing procedure to the class of
stochastic games are proposed and defined. Section 5 analyzes the four alternatives.
The last section, Sec. 6, summarizes comprehensively.
2. Notations
We study finite discounted stochastic games. A finite discounted stochastic game is
given by an ordered sextuple
Γ = 〈N, Ω, {Siω}(i,ω)∈N×Ω, {ui}i∈N , pi, δ〉 .
Here, N is the finite set of players, Ω is the state space containing a finite number
of states, and the set Siω is the finite action set of player i ∈ N in state ω ∈ Ω.
Further, ui : H → R is the payoff function of player i and pi is the transition
map pi : H → ∆(Ω), where H = {(ω, sω) |ω ∈ Ω, sω ∈ Sω} and Sω = Xi∈NSiω.
If in state ω ∈ Ω the players action choices are sω ∈ Sω, then player i gets an
instantaneous payoff of ui(ω, sω) and the probability that the system jumps to
state ω¯ is pi(ω¯ |ω, sω). Finally, δ ∈ [0, 1) is a discount factor that is used to discount
future payoffs.
Such a stochastic game corresponds to a dynamic system which can be in dif-
ferent states and where at certain stages the players can influence the course of the
play. We consider the infinite horizon model and the set of stages is assumed to be
identical with the set N = {0, 1, . . .}. Players know the game itself and that this
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knowledge is common knowledge among all the players. Moreover, the initial state
ω0 at stage k = 0 is common knowledge to the players.
The game proceeds as follows. All players i select at the initial state, simul-
taneously and independently of each other, an action si
ω0
∈ Si
ω0
. Now two things
happen, both depending on the current state ω0 and the action choices sω0 . (1)
Player i earns ui(ω0, sω0) for all i ∈ N . (2) The system jumps to the next state
ω1 according to the outcome of a chance experiment; the probability that the next
state will be ω¯ equals pi(ω¯ |ω0, sω0). Subsequently, prior to the next stage k = 1, all
players are informed about the previous actions chosen by the players, and of the
new state ω1. At stage k = 1, the above procedure repeats itself, etc.
We assume that the game is of perfect recall, i.e. at each stage each player
remembers all past actions chosen by all players and all past states that have
occurred.
Note that for finite stochastic games, each stage game resembles a normal form
game Γω. However, contrary to the situation for normal form games, the game
does not exist of a single play, but jumps according to the probability measure
pi(· |ω, sω) to the next state and continues dynamically. In choosing an action in a
certain state, a player not only takes into account the immediate payoff, but also
his opportunities in the future states.
Like in normal form games, the players are allowed to randomize their pure
actions. A mixed strategy of player i in state ω is a probability distribution on S iω.
We identify the set of all probability distributions on Siω with Σ
i
ω. The strategy
space of the normal form game in state ω is therefore equal to Σω = Xi∈NΣ
i
ω.
Given a mixed strategy combination σω ∈ Σω and a strategy σ¯iω ∈ Σiω, we denote
by (σ−iω , σ¯
i
ω) the mixed strategy that results from replacing σ
i
ω by σ¯
i
ω . If a mixed
strategy combination σω ∈ Σω is played, then the instantaneous expected payoff of
player i is denoted by ui(ω, σω) and the expected transition to state ω¯ is denoted
by pi(ω¯ |ω, σω).
The set of possible histories up to a stage k, Hk = X
k−1
κ=0
H , consists of all
sequences hk = (ω0, sω0 , ω
1, sω1 , . . . , ω
k−1, sωk−1) that could have actually occurred
up to time k. Here ωκ represents the state and sωκ the actions of the players at
stage κ, κ = 0, . . . , k − 1.
A behavior strategy σik of player i specifies for each stage k, each state ωk at time
k, and each history hk a strategy σik(hk, ωk) ∈ Σi
ωk
. So, a behavior strategy σi for
player i is a sequence σi0, σi1, . . ., where σi0 ∈ Σi := Xω∈ΩΣiω and σik : Hk → Σi
for all k ≥ 1.
A stationary strategy for player i is a behavior strategy for which σik(hk, ωk) is
of the form σi(ωk), i.e. a history independent, but state dependent strategy. In the
sequel, a stationary strategy for player i will be denoted by the symbol ρi. If player
i decides to play the stationary strategy ρi, then every time that the system is in
state ω, player i selects his pure action according to ρiω. So, a stationary strategy
ρi for player i is an element of Σi.
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Given initial state ω and a strategy σ, the stream of expected payoffs is evaluated
by
U i(ω, σ) :=
∞∑
k=0
δk · U ik(ω, σ) ,
where U ik(ω, σ) denotes the expected utility at stage k. Here, U i(ω, σ) equals the
total discounted expected payoff of player i when the discount factor equals δ, the
starting state is ω and the strategy-tuple σ is played. Since the state and action
spaces are assumed to be finite, U i(ω, σ) exists.
A strategy-tuple σ is an equilibrium if and only if σi is a best response to σ−i
for all i ∈ N .
In the sequel of this paper we will restrict ourselves to stationary strategies.
Motivations for restricting to stationary strategies are that stationary strategies
prescribe the simplest form of behavior that is consistent with rationality, that
stationarity captures the notion that “bygones are bygones”, and it embodies the
principle that “minor causes should have minor effects”. Moreover, the focus on
stationary strategies allows for clean, unobstructed analysis of the influence of the
state variables, stationary strategies substantially reduce the number of parameters
to be estimated in dynamic models, and stationary models can be simulated, see
also Maskin and Tirole (2001).
Suppose the players decide to play a stationary strategy-tuple ρ and ω is the
initial state. The total discounted expected payoff of player i is denoted by U i(ω, ρ).
The instantaneous payoff player i obtained in stage k = 0 equals ui(ω, ρω). The
probability that at the next stage the state will be ω¯ equals pi(ω¯ |ω, ρω).
When ρ is a stationary strategy-tuple and ω is the initial state, the expected
payoffs are given by the following recursive formula (see e.g. Fink (1964))
U i(ω, ρ) = ui(ω, ρ) + δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ω
pi(ω¯ |ω, ρ)U i(ω¯, ρ) .
A stationary strategy-combination ρ ∈ Σ is a stationary equilibrium if it is a Nash
equilibrium in stationary strategies. Every finite discounted stochastic game has
at least one equilibrium point in stationary strategies (see Fink (1964), Takahashi
(1964), and Sobel (1971)). In Haller and Lagonoff (2000) it is shown that the number
of stationary equilibria is generically finite. In Herings and Peeters (2000) this result
is sharpened to generic oddness. For δ = 0, the number of stationary equilibria is
the product of the number of Nash equilibria of the separate stage games. It is
shown in McLennan (1999) that the number of Nash equilibria of each stage game
might be enormous. So, for δ = 0 the number of stationary equilibria is enormous.
There is no reason to expect that the number of stationary equilibria will not be
huge when δ is unequal to 0.
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3. Linear Tracing Procedure
In this section, we fix a state ω and explain the linear tracing procedure for the
corresponding normal-form game Γω = 〈N, {Siω}i∈N , {ui(ω)}i∈N 〉.
The linear tracing procedure is a mathematical construct to model a process
of convergent expectations, by which rational players come to adopt, and expect
each other to adopt, one particular equilibrium point as the outcome for a given
game. At the beginning of this outcome-selection process, the players will as yet
lack any specific theory predicting the strategies to be used by the other players.
Accordingly, each player will express his expectations about the strategy choice
of any other player in the form of a subjective probability distribution over the
other players’ pure strategies. These subjective distributions will be called prior
probability distributions, or simply priors. An important assumption of this model
is that all players other than i will associate the same prior probability distribution
piω with any given player i. Part of the Harsanyi–Selten theory is the determination
of a prior.
The linear tracing procedure is based on a one-parameter family of auxiliary
games Γtω with t ∈ [0, 1]. In any game Γtω, every player i has the same strategy set
Σiω as he has in the original game Γω. But his payoff function v
i(t; ω) in Γtω is
vi(t; ω, ρω) = (1− t)ui(ω, p−iω , ρiω) + tui(ω, ρω) ,
where ui(ω) is his payoff in the original game Γω. Clearly, we have v
i(1; ω, ρω) =
ui(ω, ρω) so that Γ
1
ω = Γω. On the other hand, v
i(0; ω, ρω) = u
i(ω, p−iω , ρ
i
ω).
Thus Γ0ω is a game of a rather special structure in which the payoff v
i(0; ω) of
each player i will depend only on his own strategy ρiω and will be independent of
the other players’ strategy combination ρ−iω . Consequently, the game Γ
0
ω naturally
decomposes into several mutually independent and separate maximization prob-
lems, one for each player. For almost all games Γω, for almost all choices of the
prior vector pω, the game Γ
0
ω has exactly one equilibrium point ρ
0
ω, which is in pure
strategies.
For any auxiliary game Γtω, the set of all equilibrium points in Γ
t
ω will be denoted
E(Γtω). By Nash’s (1951) existence theorem for equilibrium points, all of these sets
will be nonempty. Let Lω = L(Γω , pω) be the graph of the correspondence t 
E(Γtω) for t ∈ [0, 1]. Lω will typically be a collection of pieces of one-dimensional
algebraic curves, though in degenerate cases it may also contain isolated points
and/or subsets of more than one dimension, see Herings and Peeters (2001).
Suppose the graph Lω contains a path γω connecting a point x0ω = (0, ρ0ω),
corresponding to an equilibrium point ρ0ω of the game Γ
0
ω, with a point x
1
ω = (1, ρ
∗
ω),
corresponding to an equilibrium point ρ∗ω of the original game Γ
1
ω = Γω. Then γω
will be called a feasible path, whereas x0ω and x
1
ω will be called the starting point
and the end point of this path γω, respectively. Moreover, the strategy part ρ
∗
ω of
this end point x1ω will be called the outcome selected by path γω . This strategy
combination ρ∗ω can be rationally selected as the outcome of the game because it
will always be an equilibrium point of the original game Γω.
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We can now define the linear tracing procedure: it consists of selecting an out-
come ρ∗ω for any game Γω by tracing a feasible path γω from its starting point
x0ω = (0, ρ
0
ω) to its end point x
1
ω = (1, ρ
∗
ω). For any given pair (Γω , pω), we will
call the linear tracing procedure feasible if the graph Lω = L(Γω, pω) contains at
least one feasible path γω, and we will call it well-defined if Lω contains exactly one
feasible path γω.
For any possible pair (Γω, pω), the linear tracing procedure is always feasible
but is not always well-defined (see Harsanyi (1975)). For any specific vector pω of
prior probability distributions, almost all games Γω will give rise to a well-defined
linear tracing procedure (see Herings and Peeters (2001)).
4. Stochastic Tracing Procedure
For the remainder of this paper, let a stochastic game Γ and a prior p ∈ Σ be given.
The prior p is taken out of the set of stationary strategy-combinations, because we
are selecting on stationary equilibria. Moreover, a player always has a stationary
best response if his opponents are playing stationary strategies. So, when the prior
p is an element from Σ, each player i has a stationary best response to p−i and we
can start the linear tracing procedure in a point inducing a stationary equilibrium
in Γ0.
For every t ∈ [0, 1], the stochastic tracing procedure generates a stationary
equilibrium of the stochastic game Γt = 〈N, Ω, {Σiω}ω∈Ω,i∈N , {V i(t)}i∈N 〉, where
the total expected discounted payoff function V i(t) of player i is defined such that
V i(0; ω, ρ) = U i(ω, p−i, ρi) and V i(1; ω, ρ) = U i(ω, ρ) .
The stochastic game Γ0 corresponds to a trivial stochastic game, where all players
believe that all their opponents play with probability 1 according to the prior belief.
The stochastic game Γ1 coincides with the original stochastic game Γ. Alternative
definitions of V i(t) for t ∈ (0, 1) will give rise to alternative stochastic tracing
procedures.
Given a proper definition of V i(t) for t ∈ (0, 1), the stochastic tracing procedure
S(Γ, p) is defined as the set of pairs (t, ρ) for which it holds that ρ is a stationary
equilibrium of the stochastic game Γt, i.e.
S(Γ, p) = {(t, ρ) ∈ [0, 1]× Σ|ρi is a best stationary response to ρ−i in Γt} .
The stochastic tracing procedure is said to be feasible if there exists a path in
S(Γ, p) connecting a best response against the prior to a stationary equilibrium of
the stochastic game Γ, i.e. there exists a continuous function γ : [0, 1] → S(Γ, p)
such that γ(0) ∈ S(Γ, p) ∩ ({0} × Σ) and γ(1) ∈ S(Γ, p) ∩ ({1} × Σ). In general
there may be many trajectories γ([0, 1]) that link a stationary equilibrium of Γ0 to
a stationary equilibrium of Γ1. If this trajectory is unique, then S(Γ, p) is said to
be well-defined. If the stochastic tracing procedure is well-defined, then it selects a
unique stationary equilibrium of the stochastic game Γ.
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The concepts stochastic tracing procedure, feasibility and well-definedness are
all based on the definition of V i(t) for t ∈ (0, 1). There are at least four a priori
reasonable ways in which V i(t) can be defined to extend the linear tracing procedure
of Harsanyi and Selten to the setting of stochastic games. Choices have to be made
whether a player holds correlated beliefs within a state or not, and whether a player
holds correlated beliefs across time or not.
Correlation within states, C(S), means that when a player knows that some
opponent plays according to the prior (which he expects with probability 1 − t),
he expects all opponents to play according to the prior. Alternatively, absence of
correlation within states, I(S), implies that even when a player knows that some
opponent is playing according to the prior he may not infer that other opponents
are playing according to the prior; all opponents are expected to play (1− t)pi + tρi,
independent from one another.
Correlation across time, C(T), means that when a player knows that some oppo-
nent plays according to the prior today, he expects that opponent to play according
to the prior in all future stages. Absence of correlation across time, I(T), implies
that even when a player knows that some opponent is playing according to the prior
today, this opponent might not play according to the prior in future stages. In all
future events he faces independent lotteries which assign probability 1− t to play
against the prior strategies of his opponents.
In the rationalizability literature the issue of “correlated beliefs” versus “un-
correlated beliefs” is often discussed. The second requires players to believe that
the opponent players choose their strategies independently, while the first does not.
Rationalizability with uncorrelated beliefs has been studied extensively defined by
Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984). The correlated rationalizability concept is de-
fined by Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) and is related to the correlated equilib-
rium concept of Aumann (1974, 1987).
To analyze the four possible extensions, we first have to define the four alter-
natives properly by specifying the corresponding functions V i(t). Therefore, this
section contains four subsections, with each subsection devoted to one of the alter-
natives.
4.1. Alternative 1: C (S), I (T)
Suppose beliefs are correlated within states, but not across time. Because here
correlation within states is assumed, each player expects that in stochastic game Γt
all opponents are playing according to the prior with probability 1− t and playing
strategically with probability t. The additional assumption of absence of correlation
across time causes that each player faces this lottery at every stage. Therefore, the
total discounted payoff to player i in stochastic game Γt when the initial state is ω
and ρ is played, is
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V i
C(S),I(T)
(t; ω, ρ) = (1− t)ui(ω, p−iω , ρiω) + tui(ω, ρω)
+ δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ω
[(1− t)pi(ω¯ |ω, p−iω , ρiω) + tpi(ω¯ |ω, ρω)]V iC(S),I(T)(t; ω¯, ρ) .
Stationarity implies that this payoff can be written by means of a recurrent relation.
This stationarity results from the assumption that the beliefs players have depend
only on the state and not at the stage in which the state is reached.
4.2. Alternative 2: C(S), C(T)
When we assume correlation as well within states as across time, again each player
expects that in a stochastic game Γt all opponents are playing according to the
prior with probability 1− t and playing strategically with probability t. But now,
unlike in the previous case, we have correlation across time. This means that when
a player knows that some opponent plays according to the prior today, he expects
that opponent to play according to the prior in all future stages. Apparently, unlike
in the previous case each player faces this lottery only once and this will be at
k = 0. Therefore, the total discounted payoff to player i in stochastic game Γt when
the initial state is ω and ρ is played, is
V iC(S),C(T)(t; ω, ρ) = (1− t)U i(ω, p−i, ρi) + tU i(ω, ρ) .
We can also explain the game Γt by means of payoffs and transitions. Each player
expects with probability 1 − t to face the stochastic game without externalities,
i.e. opponents’ decisions do not influence the payoffs and transitions, which are
determined as if the opponents are playing according to the prior, and with proba-
bility t, they expect to face the stochastic game with opponents playing an updated
strategy ρ−i.
A solution (t, ρ) for t ∈ (0, 1) in S(Γ, p) is not necessarily a stationary equi-
librium of the game Γt. A player i might have a non-stationary strategy that is
better than ρi against ρ−i in Γt. Namely, at k = 0 all players make their stationary
decisions believing that with probability 1− t all opponents play according to the
prior and with probability t they play strategically. In fact, in k = 0 all players
are facing a lottery. Once the players are in k = 1, they know the outcome of the
lottery. It might be better, and most of the time it will be better, to revise their
strategy having this knowledge, which would lead to a non-stationary strategy.
4.3. Alternative 3: I(S), I(T)
In this subsection we consider the situation in which absence of correlation both
within states and across time is assumed. Absence of correlation within states means
that in the stochastic game Γt a player expects that each opponent is playing
independently according to the prior with probability 1−t and playing strategically
with probability t. The additional assumption of absence of correlation across time
causes every player to face this lottery at every stage. Clearly, these assumptions
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imply the total discounted payoff to player i in stochastic game Γt when the initial
state is ω and the strategy ρ is played to be equal to
V i
I(S),I(T)
(t; ω, ρ) = U i(ω, (1− t)p−i + tρ−i, ρi) .
Just like in Subsection 4.2 it is possible, because of absence of correlation across
time, to rewrite the total discounted payoffs in recurrent form:
V i
I(S),I(T)
(t; ω, ρ) = ui(ω, (1− t)p−iω + tρ−iω , ρiω)
+ δ ·
∑
ω¯∈Ω
pi(ω¯ |ω, (1− t)p−iω + tρ−iω , ρiω)V iI(S),I(T)(t;ω¯,ρ) .
Since the decision problem a player faces depends on the state only, his problem
is stationary no matter at which stage of the game the state is realized. Assuming
that beliefs are not correlated across time captures, therefore, the presence of sta-
tionarity. Stationarity means that a recurrent relation can be given. A direct result
is that best stationary responses are best responses in the broader class of behavior
strategies as well.
4.4. Alternative 4: I(S), C(T)
When absence of correlation within states, but correlation across time is assumed,
again each player expects that in stochastic game Γt each opponent is playing ac-
cording to the prior with probability 1−t and playing strategically with probability
t. But this time, in contrast to Subsection 4.3, we have correlation across time. This
means that when a player knows that some opponent plays according to the prior
today, he expects that opponent to play according to the prior in all future stages.
Therefore, the total discounted payoff to player i in stochastic game Γt when the
initial state is ω and ρ is played, is
V iI(S),C(T)(t; ω, ρ) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
(1− t)StN−S−1U i(ω, pS, ρN\S) .
In the formula, (1−t)StN−S−1 is the probability that the opponents from S ⊆ N\{i}
are playing according to the prior, whereas the other opponents are playing strate-
gically. When player i observes that the opponents from S are playing according
to p and the others according to ρ, his total discounted payoff is U i(ω, pS , ρN\S).
Player i’s payoff in the game Γt is therefore the sum over all subsets of N \ {i} of
the probability that only the players from S play according to p (given t) times the
total expected discounted payoff in that case.
Like in Subsection 4.2, a solution (t, ρ) for t ∈ (0, 1) in S(Γ, p) is not necessarily
a stationary equilibrium of the game Γt. A player i might have a non-stationary
strategy that performs better than ρi against ρ−i in Γt. Apparently, a best sta-
tionary response is not necessarily a best response in the broader class of behavior
strategies.
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4.5. Properties
In order to be useful as a selection theory, it is important that for almost all stochas-
tic games the stochastic tracing procedure determines a unique stationary equilib-
rium. When well-definedness holds, we are sure of selecting a unique stationary
equilibrium. According to Herings and Peeters (2000), the following theorem holds:
Theorem 4.1. Assume C(S) and I(T). For an open set of stochastic games Γ
and priors p ∈ Σ with full Lebesgue measure, the stochastic tracing procedure is
well-defined.
We also claim the following result:
Theorem 4.2. Assume I(S) and I(T). For an open set of stochastic games Γ and
priors p ∈ Σ with full Lebesgue measure, the stochastic tracing procedure is well-
defined.
Proof. Since the stochastic tracing procedure when I(S) and I(T) is assumed can
be written as a recurrent relation, the proof of this theorem is completely analogous
to the proof in Herings and Peeters (2000).
For the alternatives where C(T) is assumed, it is not possible to rewrite the
payoffs into a recurrent relation. Therefore, to prove similar theorems with C(T)
assumed, calls for different techniques of proof. Nevertheless, it should be expected
that generic well-definedness holds as well when C(T) is assumed. Since the number
of variables is one less than the number of constraints imposed by the concept of
stationary equilibrium, there is one degree of freedom left. Under suitable transver-
sality conditions, this should be sufficient to show well-definedness.
5. Analysis of Alternatives
We proceed by analyzing the four alternatives defined so far. The first part of this
section is devoted to lay bare that the choice about beliefs within states matter. As
the proof of the pudding is in the eating, this is done by an example. Next, in the
second part of this section the same will be done for the assumption with respect
to beliefs across time.
5.1. Beliefs within states
We create an example for which it matters whether correlation or absence of cor-
relation within states is assumed, in the sense that different stationary equilibria
will be selected starting from the same prior. Before doing so, it is important to
know the minimal size of such an example. In case there are two players, assuming
absence or presence of correlation within states does not matter since the number
of opponents is 1.
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Fig. 1. Game Γ: C(S) vs. I(S).
Proposition 5.1. For n = 2, the stochastic tracing procedure based on I(S) is
identical to one based on C(S).
So, we need n ≥ 3 to construct an example.
Consider the normal form game of Fig. 1. This is a special case of a stochastic
game, i.e. a stochastic game with only one state and discount factor equal to 0. The
advantage of considering a normal form games, is that it disconnects assumptions
on beliefs within states and assumptions on beliefs across time.
Note that this game possesses three stationary equilibria: the pure stationary
equilibria (s1; s2; s3) and (s1
′
; s2
′
; s3
′
), and a mixed stationary equilibrium all play-
ers play their first strategy with probability
√
2−1 and their second with probability
2−√2. Because the discount factor is taken equal to 0, it does not matter whether
I(T) or C(T) is assumed.
Suppose we take the following prior:
p =
((
1
6
,
5
6
)
;
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
;
(
2
3
,
1
3
))
.
Note that for the best response against the prior it does not matter whether C(S)
or I(S) is assumed. Both alternatives lead to the same best response to all possible
priors.
Here, the prior is chosen such that we have the point (0, (s1; s2
′
; s3
′
)) as starting
point. Player 1 starts playing the equilibrium strategy of the first pure stationary
equilibrium and players 2 and 3 start playing the equilibrium strategy of the second
pure stationary equilibrium. To obtain a stationary equilibrium, at least one player
has to switch to another pure strategy. It turns out that in the case of I(S), player 2
or 3 is switching his strategy before player 1, whereas in the other case, C(S),
player 1 is the first player willing to switch his strategy.
5.1.1. When I(S) is assumed
When absence of correlation within states is assumed, Γt has the form as depicted
in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. Game Γt when I(S) is assumed.
The first element in the first box is the payoff to player 1 if he plays s1 and he
expects player 2 to play according to the prior with probability 1− t and s2 with
probability t and expects player 3 to play according to the prior with probability 1−t
and s3 with probability t. So, player 1 expects player 2 to play ( 12 (1−t)+t, 12 (1−t))
and player 3 to play ( 23 (1− t) + t, 13 (1− t)) and the expected payoff when playing
s1 is therefore ( 12 (1− t) + t)( 23 (1− t) + t)2 = 13 (1 + t)(2 + t).
For all t ∈ [0, 1] it is possible to compute all stationary equilibria of Γt. Since
we are only interested in the stationary equilibrium selected, we only determine
the path starting at t = 0 and terminating at t = 1. Obviously, by the way we
constructed the prior, the path starts in the point (s1; s2
′
; s3
′
). This point is a
stationary equilibrium of Γt as long as t ≤ 1/10. When t = 1/10, player 2 is
indifferent between his two pure strategies. So, at t = 1/10 the path jumps from
(s1; s2
′
; s3
′
) to (s1; s2; s3
′
). Next, the point (s1; s2; s3
′
) is a stationary equilibrium
of Γt until t = 1/5(29 − 2√189) ≈ 0.3009, when player 3 is indifferent between
his two pure strategies. Here, in t = 1/5(29− 2√189), we jump from (s1; s2; s3′) to
(s1; s2; s3) which is a stationary equilibrium of Γt for all t ∈ [1/5(29−2√189), 1]. The
point (s1; s2; s3) is therefore the stationary equilibrium selected by the stochastic
tracing procedure when I(S) is assumed. The path is displayed graphically in Fig. 3.
This figure shows a cube moving from t = 0 to t = 1. The cube itself displays
ð
ñ
ñ
ñ
ò óôöõ
÷ùøúüûý¼þ
ß  	

 
Fig. 3. Feasible path when I(S) is assumed.
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the set of stationary strategy-combinations. The strategic possibilities of player 1,
player 2 and player 3 are displayed in the horizontal, diagonal, respectively vertical
direction. The point marked with a star is the point where all players play their
first pure strategy.
5.1.2. When C(S) is assumed
When correlation within states is assumed, Γt has the form as depicted in Fig. 4.
The first element in the first box is the payoff to player 1 if he plays s1 and he
expects players 2 and 3 to play according to the prior with probability 1−t and their
first pure strategy with probability t. So, player 1 expects with probability 1 − t
that players 2 and 3 are playing ( 12 ,
1
2 ) and (
2
3 ,
1
3 ) respectively and with probability
t that players 2 and 3 are playing s2 and s3 respectively. The expected payoff to
player 1 when playing s1 will therefore be equal to ((1− t) 12 23 + t)2 = 23 (1− t) + 2t.
Again, it is possible to compute all stationary equilibria of Γt, for t ∈ [0, 1].
And, again, we restrict ourselves to determine the path starting at t = 0 and
terminating at t = 1. Just as before, the path starts in the point (s1; s2
′
; s3
′
).



 
ﬁﬀﬃﬂ	
 !"#
Fig. 4. Game Γt when C(S) is assumed.
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Fig. 5. Feasible path when C(S) is assumed.
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This point is a stationary equilibrium point as long as t ≤ 1/3. When t = 1/3,
player 1 is indifferent between both his pure strategies and will be the first player
to switch to another pure strategy unlike in the previous case. At t = 1/3, the
path jumps from (s1; s2
′
; s3
′
) to (s1
′
; s2
′
; s3
′
). The point (s1
′
; s2
′
; s3
′
) is a stationary
equilibrium of Γt up to t = 1 and this point is therefore the stationary equilibrium
selected by the stochastic tracing procedure when C(S) is assumed. The path is
displayed graphically in Fig. 5 and is displayed in the same style as Fig. 3.
5.2. Beliefs across time
Again, it is important to know the minimal size of an example for which it matters
whether correlation or absence of correlation across time is assumed. In the next
proposition we claim that C(T) and I(T) select the same stationary equilibrium for
stochastic games with one state (repeated game), when the process never leaves
a state (finite number of independent repeated games) or when future payoffs are
ignored (finite number of normal games).
Proposition 5.2. When pi = 1Ω or δ = 0, the stochastic tracing procedure based
on I(T) is identical to one based on C(T).
Proof. Suppose we have a repeated game, i.e. |Ω| = 1 and therefore trivially
pi = 1Ω. In this case, the total discounted payoffs for the four alternatives are:
V iC(S),I(T)(t; ρ) = (1− t)ui(p−i, ρi) + tui(ρ) + δ V iC(S),I(T)(t; ρ) ,
V i
C(S),C(T)
(t; ρ) = (1− t)U i(p−i, ρi) + tU i(ρ) ,
V i
I(S),I(T)
(t; ρ) = ui((1− t)p−i + tρ−i, ρi) + δ V i
I(S),I(T)
(t; ρ) ,
and
V iI(S),C(T)(t; ρ) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
(1− t)StN−S−1U i(pS , ρN\S) .
First, note that
V i
C(S),C(T)
(t; ρ) = (1− t)U i(p−i, ρi) + tU i(ρ)
= (1− t)[ui(p−i, ρi) + δ U i(p−i, ρi)] + t[ui(ρ) + δ U i(ρi)]
= (1− t)ui(p−i, ρi) + tui(ρ) + δ · [(1− t)U i(p−i, ρi) + tU i(ρ)]
= (1− t)ui(p−i, ρi) + tui(ρ) + δ V i
C(S),C(T)
(t; ρ) .
And secondly, note that
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V i
I(S),C(T)
(t; ρ) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}(1− t)StN−S−1U i(pS , ρN\S)
=
∑
S⊆N\{i}
(1− t)StN−S−1[ui(pS , ρN\S) + δ U i(pS , ρN\S)]
=
∑
S⊆N\{i}
(1− t)StN−S−1ui(pS , ρN\S)
+ δ ·
∑
S⊆N\{i}
(1− t)StN−S−1U i(pS , ρN\S)
= ui((1− t)p−i + tρ−i, ρi) + δ V i
I(S),C(T)
(t; ρ) .
Finally, observe that
V i
C(S),I(T)
(t; ρ) = V i
C(S),C(T)
(t; ρ) ,
and that
V iI(S),I(T)(t; ρ) = V
i
I(S),C(T)(t; ρ)
for all (t; ρ) ∈ [0, 1]× Σ. So, for repeated games C(T) and I(T) are equivalent.
From this the equivalence between C(T) and I(T) follows trivially when pi = 1Ω
as being a finite number of independent repeated games.
When δ = 0, the stochastic game is equivalent to a one shot game in which time
plays no role when stationary strategies are assumed.
Consider the stochastic game of Fig. 6. The stochastic game displayed in that
figure is a stochastic game with two states. In the first state both players have
two pure strategies, whereas in the second state both players have one strategy.
The upper-left corner of each box contains the payoffs. The transition probabilities
are displayed in the lower-right corner, where the first element is the probability
that in the next stage the game will be in the first state, the second element is the
probability that the game will be in the second state at the next stage.
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Fig. 6. Game Γ: C(T) vs. I(T).
January 12, 2004 12:24 WSPC/151-IGTR 00108
322 P. J.-J. Herings & R. J. A. P. Peeters
When both players play their second strategy in state ω, they both expect to
earn 0 at the current stage, go to state ω′, earn 4 at the next stage and then return
to state ω. Notice that the game at ω′ is completely degenerate. There is no need
for players to make a choice. They simply collect a payoff of 4. When ω is the initial
state, both players expect to earn 43 (1 +
1
9 +
1
81 + · · ·) = 32 in total when both
always play their second pure strategy. Suppose the box that belongs to strategy-
combination (s1ω
′
; s2ω
′
) had 1,1 in the upper-left corner and 1,0 in the lower-right
corner. Then the game is always in state ω when ω is the initial state, so coincides
with a repeated game. When both players play their second pure strategy again at
all times, they both expect to earn (1+ 13 +
1
9 + · · · = 32 ) again. Nevertheless, the two
resulting stochastic games are not strategically equivalent when mixed strategies
are played. It turns out that (( 12 ,
1
2 ); (
1
2 ,
1
2 )) is not a stationary equilibrium in the
stochastic game of Fig. 6 unlike in the adapted stochastic game (the repeated game).
Although the stochastic game of Fig. 6 is close to a repeated game, for which C(T)
and I(T) are equivalent, it is not quite.
The stochastic game of Fig. 6 possesses three stationary equilibria: the pure
stationary equilibria (s1ω; s
2
ω) and (s
1
ω
′
; s2ω
′
), and the symmetric mixed stationary
equilibrium where both players play their first strategy with probability 4− 2√3 ≈
0.5359 and the other strategy with the rest of the probability mass.
Just like in the previous example, we want the starting point of the stochastic
tracing procedure not to be a stationary equilibrium strategy-combination of the
original game. This can be arranged by taking for one player the prior play of
the first strategy smaller than 4 − 2√3 and the reverse for the other. Without
loss of generality, let the first player mentioned be player 1. Given such a prior,
player 1 will prefer strategy s1ω and player 2 will prefer strategy s
2
ω
′
. Consider the
prior
p =
((
1
2
,
1
2
)
;
(
2
3
,
1
3
))
,
which satisfies this property. Note that the starting point, in this case (s1ω ; s
2
ω
′
),
is independent of the choice made between the two assumptions I(T) and C(T).
Because the stochastic game depicted is a game with two players, it does not matter
whether C(S) or I(S) is assumed.
5.2.1. When I(T) is assumed
In Fig. 7 the stage game for t = 0 is given. The figure is almost similar to Fig. 6. The
difference is found in the lower-right corner of the boxes, which is divided into two
sectors. The lower-left sector displays the transition probabilities as player 1 thinks
they are, the upper-right sector the transition probabilities as player 2 thinks they
are. For example, when player 1 plays s1ω
′
he expects to receive 0 and expects that
in the next stage the state will be ω with probability 2/3 and ω′ with probability
1/3.
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Fig. 7. Game Γ0 when I(T) is assumed.
The stage games Γtω can now be defined as Γ
t
ω = (1−t)Γ0ω +tΓ1ω for all t ∈ (0, 1).
For all t ∈ [0, 1], it is possible to compute all stationary equilibria of Γt, but since
we are only interested in the stationary equilibrium selected, we only determine the
path starting at t = 0 and terminating in t = 1. As mentioned before, the path
starts in the point (s1ω ; s
2
ω
′
). This point is a stationary equilibrium point as long
t ≤ 12 (23−
√
513) ≈ 0.1752, the moment player 1 is indifferent between both his pure
strategies. Player 2 is not willing to switch strategy as long as t ≤ 16 (11−
√
97) ≈
0.1919. So, player 1 is the first to change his strategy and at t = 12 (23 −
√
513)
the path jumps from (s1ω; s
2
ω
′
) to (s1ω
′
; s2ω
′
). This point is a stationary equilibrium
point for all t ∈ [ 12 (23 −
√
513), 1]. The point (s1ω
′
; s2ω
′
) is therefore the stationary
equilibrium selected by the stochastic tracing procedure when I(T) is assumed. The
path is displayed graphically in Fig. 8.
This figure shows the Cartesian product of the strategy space, a square, and the
interval [0, 1]. The strategic possibilities of player 1 and player 2 are displayed in the
horizontal, respectively vertical direction. The point marked with a star corresponds
to both players playing their first pure strategy.

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Fig. 8. Feasible path when I(T) is assumed.
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5.2.2. When C(T) is assumed
When C(T), correlation across time, is assumed, Γt cannot be represented easily
in a figure. Again, the path starts in the point (s1ω; s
2
ω
′
). Given that player 2 plays
s2ω
′
during the whole play with probability t and according to the prior during
the whole play with probability 1 − t, the best stationary response of player 1 is
playing s1ω as long as t is less than 4/19. When t is larger than 4/19 his other pure
stationary strategy, that is s1ω
′
, will be his best stationary response. Vice versa,
when player 2 expects player 1 to play according to the prior the whole stochastic
game with probability 1 − t and s1ω the whole play with probability t, his best
stationary response is playing strategy s2ω
′
when t ≤ 1/15 and s2ω otherwise. So,
player 2 will be the first player to switch strategy, since 1/15 < 4/19. Therefore,
at t = 1/15, the path will jump from (s1ω ; s
2
ω
′
) to (s1ω; s
2
ω). From t = 1/15 up to
t = 1 the point (s1ω; s
2
ω) is the stationary equilibrium and is also the stationary
equilibrium selected by the stochastic tracing procedure when C(T) is assumed.
The path is plotted in Fig. 9 and is displayed in the same style as Fig. 8.
5.3. Extending the linear tracing procedure
The first subsection showed that the choice between assuming absence of correlation
or assuming presence of correlation within states can cause different stationary
equilibria to be selected. Although this was shown by means of a normal form
game, the same result would have been found if we made it a repeated game by
taking a positive discount factor, i.e. δ ∈ (0, 1).
In the selection theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), the linear tracing proce-
dure of Harsanyi (1975) is used to select on a Nash equilibrium of a normal form
game. The structure of the linear tracing procedure there assumed beliefs to be
correlated. The most natural extension of the linear tracing procedure is therefore
the one that assumes correlation within states. For instance, this choice implies
that for repeated games, the stationary equilibria which is selected is the repeated
Nash equilibrium that is selected by the linear tracing procedure for the stage game
©
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´ µ¶·
Fig. 9. Feasible path when C(T) is assumed.
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using the same prior.
The second subsection showed that the choice between assuming absence of
correlation or assuming presence of correlation across time can cause different sta-
tionary equilibria to be selected. When C(T) is assumed, a point (t, ρ) on the feasible
path is not necessarily a stationary equilibrium of Γt. For some player i there might
be a better behavior strategy than ρi against ρ−i in Γt which is non-stationary, i.e. a
best stationary response is not necessarily a best response in the broader class of
behavior strategies. However, assuming that beliefs are not correlated across time,
that is assuming I(T), captures the assumption of stationarity. The beliefs of a
player will depend only on the state reached and not on the stage at which it is
reached. We would therefore argue that the assumption of C(S) and I(T) leads to a
stochastic tracing procedure that is the most natural extension of the linear tracing
procedure of Harsanyi and Selten.
6. Summary
In this paper the linear tracing procedure of Harsanyi (1975) is extended in order
to select on an equilibrium for stochastic games, more precisely, to select on a
stationary equilibrium for stochastic games. There are four reasonable extensions.
After having defined all four properly, it is shown by examples that these extensions
are independent. The most natural extension, assumes that players hold correlated
beliefs within states, but do not hold correlated beliefs across time, since this is
the only possible extension consistent with the formulation of Harsanyi for normal
form games that captures stationarity. This extension is defined as the stochastic
tracing procedure. It follows immediately from the results in Herings and Peeters
(2000) that it is well-defined for almost all stochastic games.
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